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Abstract
We characterize the steady state of a market with random matching and bargaining, where
the sellers’ goods can perish overnight. Generically, the quantity traded is suboptimal, prices are
dispersed and there is a dead-weight loss caused by excess supply or demand. In the limit as the
cost of staying in the market tends to zero, only the amount of trade tends to the efficient level, the
other two non-competitive characteristics remain. We discuss the implications of these findings
on the foundations of competitive equilibrium and on the robustness of the results in the literature
on durable-good markets.
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1 Introduction
The literature on dynamic decentralized markets for a homogeneous good
assumes that the good traded does not lose its value over time: it is non-
perishable. Under this assumption, it has been shown that — in general —
when information is complete and frictions are small, the outcome of strategic
interaction in a steady-state market is approximately eﬃcient (thus provid-
ing a non-cooperative foundation for competitive equilibrium)1. In practice,
however, it is often the case that a delay of the transaction would imply a
lower value placed on the item, at least in expected terms. There are two
salient ways this can happen. The first one — depreciation — corresponds
to the situation where there is a deterministic, gradually decreasing relation
between an item’s age and its (expected) value. While this scenario is a good
representation of some goods — say, a closed-end bond — the assumption of
predictability is rather strong, and the analysis of the model is too complex,
as items of diﬀerent age coexisting in the market essentially make it into
one of diﬀerentiated products. Instead, we concentrate on the other possi-
bility, where decay is sudden and it occurs in a random manner. We call
this phenomenon perishability. Obvious cases are when the object itself may
“malfunction” or “rot”. Think of a washing machine or fresh produce. Our
model is suﬃciently general to encompass both type of goods, despite the
noticeable diﬀerence that a washing machine is a durable good (modulo per-
ishability) as it provides both the seller and the buyer with a flow of utility,
while milk is a consumption good which provides utility on a single date.
As further applications, note that the decrease in the good’s value may
also come as a result of a change in preferences — as in the case of fashion
goods — or a change in market structure — as in the case of industries with a
high R&D component.2 Finally, an extreme form of perishability is the one
that characterizes individualized services: if the time-slot of a dentist is not
used for treating a patient, it is irretrievably lost.
In short, the analysis of the trade of perishable goods is empirically rel-
evant, and therefore called for. We re-examine the question of decentralized
dynamic price formation when the good traded is perishable to some degree.
Namely, each single item may become worthless in each period with some
1See Gale (1987, 2000).
2These latter examples are special, as the shocks aﬀecting identical items are (perfectly)
correlated. This phenomenon is usually called obsolescence in the literature.
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(given) probability.3
Our main finding is that a market for a perishable good is inherently
ineﬃcient. Moreover, this ineﬃciency is not generated by the “wrong” trades
taking place.4 Rather, it stems from a queuing externality: the dead-weight
loss created by too many buyers entering the market. This externality is
so large that as the waiting costs disappear, not only does the buyer queue
become infinite but it grows at such a rate that the aggregate cost of waiting
does not vanish.
We begin by illustrating the issues with an example in Section 2. We
continue by a brief review of the literature in Section 3. Section 4 intro-
duces our model and the eﬃciency benchmark. In Section 5 we analyze the
steady state of our market. We explore the implications of our results for the
foundations of competitive equilibrium in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 A didactic example
The purpose of this section is twofold: i) to provide an illustration of the
main ineﬃciency result, ii) to shed some light on the process by which the
steady-state is reached in equilibrium.
Consider a market for fresh milk. There are 3 newly generated units of
demand for milk every day with marginal valuations {24, 20, 19} and 3 newly
generated units of potential supply with marginal valuations {15, 16, 23}.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. The 3 potential buyers and 3 potential sellers
must decide whether to enter a decentralized market that may include buyers
from previous days who have yet to purchase milk. The milk turns sour
overnight, so there are no milk units available from previous days. Market
participation costs the buyers cb = 1 and the sellers cs = 0.1 per day. Each
day, the buyers and sellers in the market are randomly matched into pairs,
and if the number of buyers and sellers is unequal, then the remainder do
3While we set up our model with random shocks that are independent, our analysis
also captures the correlated case when the new good, which makes the old one obsolete,
is replacing the old one immediately and where its supply and demand are also the same
as those of the old one.
4This is what is driving the results of Gale and Sabourian (2005), who show that in
a market game of one-time entry (without a steady-state), heterogeneity of valuations is
suﬃcient to cause ineﬃciency, as high valuation buyers may trade with high valuation
sellers, and low valuation sellers with low valuation buyers, increasing the amount of trade
but decreasing the aggregate gains from trade.
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not trade. Matched traders first observe each other’s valuations of the good
and then engage in bargaining where a trader gets to make a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer to his trading partner and both traders are equally likely to be the
proposer. If the oﬀer is accepted, trade takes place and both agents leave the
market. If the oﬀer is rejected, then the buyer joins the matching pool the
following day and the seller leaves the market.
24 
15 
PS, PD
1 2 3 q 
Supply and demand
Starting at date 1, the eﬃcient outcome is clearly where the two higher
valuation buyers and the two lower valuation sellers enter and both oﬀers are
accepted. Since there will be no market participants who failed to trade, the
same will be true on day 2, 3 and so on. Hence the Pareto eﬃcient flow of
surplus per day will be 24− 15 + 20− 16− 2× 1− 2× .1 = 10.8.
Now let us look at this market in equilibrium. Let V Bt (b) be the value of
participation in the market for a buyer who is in the market on day t and
has valuation b (this could be a new entrant or a buyer who is yet to find a
match). Let V St (s) be the value of participation in the market for a seller with
valuation s who enters the market (with fresh milk) on day t. On day one,
a seller who makes a proposal asks for b − V B2 (b) (oﬀer the buyer a surplus
equal to his continuation value), provided that this does not involve a loss
for the seller — whose continuation value is zero, as the good is perishable.
A buyer who makes a proposal oﬀers the seller her valuation, s (that is, no
additional surplus), provided that this gives the buyer at least V B2 (b) as this
is what the buyer would get if he failed to trade. Hence in a perfect Bayesian
3
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equilibrium5
V S1 (s) =
1
2
πs1Eb[max{b− s− V B2 (b), 0}]− 0.1 (1)
V B1 (b) =
1
2
πb1Es[max{b− s, V B2 (b)}] + (1−
1
2
πb1)V
B
2 (b)− 1 (2)
where πs1 and π
b
1 are the probabilities that the sellers and buyers, respectively,
are matched on day one. Consider the following candidate for an equilibrium:
2 buyers {24, 20} and 2 sellers {15, 16} enter each period, a buyer with val-
uation 19 enters only in period 1 and all matches end in trade. Then we
have a process that is stationary from the point of view of the buyers since —
whether or not the valuation-19 buyer has already traded and been replaced
by a valuation-20 or -24 buyer — πbt ≡ 23 and the sellers are the same each
period. Solving (2) gives V B(24) = 5.5, V B(20) = 1.5 and V B(19) = 0.5. So
it is indeed optimal for the buyer with valuation 19 to enter the market on
the first day if there is no future entry by a valuation-19 buyer. The sellers’
value on day t will be given by
V St (s) =
1
2
[(1− 1
3t
)((
1
2
(24−s−5.5)+ 1
2
(20−s−1.5)))+ 1
3t
(19−s−0.5)]−0.1
because there is a 1 in 3t chance that she is matched with the valuation-19
buyer who entered in the first period.6 V St (s) is positive for s = 15 and
s = 16. Since b− s > V B2 (b) for all participating buyers and sellers it is true
that all matches end in trade. We also need to check that the other potential
traders are happy with their non-participation. The valuation-23 seller does
not wish to enter. She would not trade with a buyer with valuation 20 or 19,
as this is less than her marginal valuation, while a buyer with valuation 24
would not accept a price above 23.7 Finally, consider the case where a second
valuation-19 buyer enters on day 2 but there is no further excess entry. Then
V B2 (24) = 4.5, V
B
2 (20) = 0.5 and V
B
2 (19) = −0.5. Since further entry only
5Eb (Es) denotes the expectation operator over the buyer (seller) types who are in
the market in any given period in equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume that market
participants cannot observe who are actually in the market. In the general model this will
not be an issue (in equilibrium) as there will be a continuum of traders.
6In each period the probability that the valuation-19 buyer does not trade is 1/3. In
the current period there is a probability of 1/3 that he is matched with a given seller.
7He would have at least a 1 in 2 chance of meeting the seller with a valuation of 16 or less
in the next period and so is guaranteed a continuation payoﬀ of at least 12 × 12 × 8− 1 = 1.
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makes matters worse, the valuation-19 buyer would definitely make a loss
from entering in period 2.8 Hence, we have shown that the eﬃcient outcome
is not an equilibrium, as a deviation by the valuation-19 buyer in the first
period is profitable. Instead we have an equilibrium where a single buyer with
valuation 19 enters in period 1, resulting in a permanent buyer queue. The
equilibrium does not give rise to a steady state because V St (s) is changing over
time. The reason for this variation is that the probability that the buyer with
b = 19 is still in the market is diminishing over time. Eventually, this buyer
must trade and is replaced by either a b = 20 or a b = 24 buyer in the queue.
Thus, the system approaches a steady state with limt→∞ V St (15) = 1.65 and
limt→∞ V
S
t (16) = 1.15.
The flow of surplus per day in this steady state is 5.5+1.5+1.65+1.15 =
9.8. Hence, ignoring the eﬃciency loss caused by the fact that there is a point
at which the buyer with valuation 19 trades (displacing a trade with a buyer
of higher valuation), there is still a loss of 1 per day, relative to the eﬃcient
steady state. The only departure from the eﬃcient steady state is the entry
of a buyer with valuation 19 in period 1. However, this entry creates a large
externality which significantly reduces the per period flow of surplus as each
buyer now expects to incur the cost 1 + 1
3
+
¡
1
3
¢2
+ ... = 3
2
, because with
probability 1
3
they do not trade each day. In the eﬃcient case the cost is only
1, as they trade on the same day.
The striking result is that the ineﬃciency persists even if we reduce the
costs towards zero, as in equilibrium this simply makes the queue longer. In
the above example a buyer with valuation 19 will enter if cbπbt
> 1
2
(1
2
(19 −
16)+ 1
2
(19− 15)) = 7
4
. Every period where a buyer with valuation 19 enters,
the queue increases by 1 and πbt falls. A buyer with valuation 19 does not
enter on day t if πbt =
2
t+2 <
4cb
7
. Hence, in equilibrium, the last period in
which a buyer with valuation 19 enters is given by max[t ∈ I | t < 14
4cb − 2],
where I is the set of integers. If we take cb = 0.1, we obtain that a buyer
with valuation 19 enters on each of the first 33 days. As above, the system
eventually approaches a steady state, now with V B(24) = 5, V B(20) = 1,
V S(15) = 1.9, V S(16) = 1.4. Note that despite the lower cost of staying in the
market the buyers are worse oﬀ as they have a lower probability of matching.
This, in turn, improves the sellers’ bargaining position, leading to a higher
8Delaying his entry in the hope that the incumbent 19 valuation buyer will have already
traded makes no sense, as he will have been replaced by a buyer with an even higher
valuation.
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steady-state payoﬀ for them. The aggregate welfare eﬀect is still negative,
though. The loss per day relative to the eﬃcient steady state will be the
waiting cost of the 33 unserved buyers: 3.3. In the limit as the participation
costs go to zero the queue becomes infinitely long and the aggregate loss per
day approaches limcb→0
³
14
4cb − 2
´
cb = 3.5.
3 A brief literature review
The literature on the non-cooperative foundations for competitive equilib-
rium originates from Diamond (1971) and Rothschild (1973). Previously,
attempts at explaining how a market could find and settle at an equilibrium
price were in the tradition of tatônnement processes, where some “Walrasian
auctioneer” would collect data on demands and supplies at proposed prices
and then adjust these prices according to excess demand or supply. The main
feature of this approach is that agents are supposed to react to announced
prices as if there was going to be trade at those prices, even though this is
only the case after infinitely many rounds without trade. In a finite market,
however, rational, strategic agents would clearly have an incentive not to
report truthfully. Therefore, it is unclear whether the equilibrium of a finite
market with strategic agents would converge to the competitive equilibrium
as the number of agents tends to infinity. As Rothschild (1973, p. 1285-6)
puts it, “a satisfactory model of adjustment to equilibrium will have at least
three parts: a discussion of the rules which market participants follow when
the market is out of equilibrium; a description of how a market system in
which individuals follow these rules operates; and, of course, a convergence
theorem.”
Diamond’s (1971) seminal contribution both showed the way forward and
signalled the accompanying diﬃculties. He presented a model of a market
where interaction was decentralized, with randomly matched traders where
switching trading partners was costly. This approach eliminated the need
for an artificial auctioneer, but at the cost that it did not converge to the
competitive equilibrium as frictions disappeared! The local monopoly power
of price-setting sellers did not vanish as the cost of partner switching became
negligible. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) have generalized the intuition
that the distorting eﬀect of local bargaining power does not vanish to the
case where instead of price setting by the seller there is a non-cooperative
bargaining game played between a matched buyer and seller. Gale (1987)
6
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then pointed out that the non-Walrasian outcome of Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky (1985) should not be taken at face value. In the steady state of a dynamic
market game it should not be the stocks of supply and demand that clear.
Rather it should be the flows which clear the market, which indeed do in
the Rubinstein-Wolinsky model and its generalizations (see Gale, 2000, for
an in-depth discussion). In the third millennium the main thrust of this lit-
erature has been on the one hand to incorporate many-to-one matching and
thus auctions (which also makes possible the easy incorporation of asym-
metric information) into the mechanism (see De Fraja and Sákovics, 2001,
and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov, 2004), while on the other hand to exam-
ine the implications of bounded rationality see (Sabourian, 2004, Gale and
Sabourian, 2005). In this paper, we take an alternative route instead. We
stick with one-to-one matching and complete information bilateral bargaining
but relax the assumption that the good traded is non-perishable.
4 The general model
Take a market that evolves over (discrete) time, say, days. Buyers are seek-
ing to purchase one unit of an indivisible, homogeneous good, and sellers
have one unit for sale each. Any item that has not been sold during the day
perishes overnight with probability d ∈ [0, 1]. Every day a new cohort of
(a continuum of) potential buyers and sellers appear who (simultaneously)
decide whether to enter the market — considering their outside option normal-
ized to zero. The aggregate inverse demand function of each new cohort of
potential buyers is P d(.), assumed continuous and strictly decreasing, while
the aggregate inverse supply function of each new cohort of potential sellers is
P s(.), assumed continuous and strictly increasing. We will make a distinction
between goods that are consumed at one point in time, consumption goods,
and goods that are consumed everyday until they perish, durable goods. The
crucial diﬀerence between the two cases is that with a consumption good a
seller who has not traded will have the choice of consuming the good today
or participating in the market tomorrow (whereas with a durable good, if
she fails to trade today she can consume the good for one more day before
trading tomorrow and so she faces no trade-oﬀ). Consequently, the outside
option (relative to continuing in the market) of the seller of a consumption
good would equal her valuation for it, while the sellers of durable goods can
be thought of as having an outside option of zero. For ease of exposition,
7
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we normalize all outside options to zero, meaning that in the former case
the value of participation in the market is the value in excess of the sellers’
valuation.
Let us digress here to look at how this model covers the examples given
in the introduction. Milk is a consumption good and a washing machine
is a durable good. In both these examples, the supply function is a seller
valuation curve. In the case of milk, the seller valuation is simply derived
from its one oﬀ consumption value whereas with a washing machine it is the
present discounted value from using the washing machine daily. The model
also covers examples where the supply function is a seller cost curve as long
as the cost (either production or transaction) is incurred once trade is agreed.
This situation is technically equivalent to the durable good case because no
extra cost is incurred by waiting. We can think of services as the limiting
case of this where d = 1 since if a seller fails to trade during a particular time
slot, this time slot is lost for ever.
The traders who decide to enter the market join those who have entered
before but have yet to trade. Then, all the incumbent traders participate
in an anonymous, one-to-one random matching process, where each trader
on the same side of the market has equal probability of being matched (πs
and πb for sellers and buyers, respectively)9 and is matched to each trader on
the other side of the market with equal probability. For simplicity, we also
assume that the matching technology is eﬃcient, that is, the traders on the
short side of the market always find a partner. Matched traders first observe
each other’s valuations of the good and then engage in bilateral bargaining.
Bargaining takes the following simple form: with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) the
buyer — (1− λ) the seller — makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to his trading
partner. If the oﬀer is accepted, trade takes place and both agents leave the
market. If the oﬀer is rejected, then together with the unmatched traders
they join the matching pool the following period.10 Finally, market partici-
pation is costly: buyers and sellers incur a cost of cb and cs, respectively, per
period while they are in the market.
Denote the diﬀerence between the (inverse) demand and supply functions
by G(.), that is, G(x) ≡ P d(x) − P s(x). Then the (constrained) eﬃcient
flow of trade is given by xe = G−1(cb + cs), that is, the quantity at which
9We concentrate the analysis on the steady state, so the matching probabilities do not
vary over time.
10In the seller’s case, provided that her good has not perished and that she decides not
to consume the (consumption) good.
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the trade surplus of the marginal participants is equal to the total cost of
participating. As the costs approach zero, xe → xc, which is the static
market clearing equilibrium corresponding to the per-period flow of demand
and supply: P d(xc) = P s(xc) = pc. The competitive benchmark for our
dynamic model can then be straightforwardly defined as the outcome where
the trades in every period are given by xe (xc in the limit) AND where there
are no traders waiting (overnight) at any time.
5 The steady state and its characteristics
We wish to examine the limiting steady-state behavior of this market, espe-
cially in terms of its eﬃciency. More precisely, we are looking for a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, where the composition of the market and the amount
traded is constant over time and the participation costs are very small. We
will compare this outcome to the eﬃcient one.11
We begin by setting up the steady state equations. The traders’ value
functions will depend on whether they are trading a consumption good, C or
a durable good,D. Denote the buyers’ and sellers’ value functions upon entry
in a stationary equilibrium by Vi(b) and Vi(s), respectively, where i ∈ {C,D}.
We then have
Vi(s) = πs(1− λ)Eb[max{b− s− Vi(b), Ci(s)}] + (3)
(1− πs(1− λ))Ci(s)− cs
and
Vi(b) = πbλEs[max{b− s− Ci(s), Vi(b)}] + (4)
(1− πbλ)Vi(b)− cb
whereCi(s) is the seller value at the point where she has failed to trade. In the
durable good case, this is simply CD(s) = (1− d)VD(s). In the consumption
good case (with types denoting valuations) there is an additional cost of
waiting to trade in the next period, ds; if the item is not consumed today
it may perish and will not be consumed at all. If this cost is suﬃciently
high then the seller will consume the good today and get s rather than
11We are going to ignore the trivial equilibrium, where there is zero measure of entry
on either side of the market (and hence there is no trade either).
9
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participate in the market tomorrow and get (1−d)(VC(s)+s). Hence CC(s) =
max[(1− d)(VC(s) + s), s]− s = max[(1− d)VC(s)− ds, 0].
The value functions are constructed as follows. With probability πs(1−λ),
a seller gets matched and is allowed to name the price. She will either make
an oﬀer, which leaves the buyer indiﬀerent about accepting (b− Vi(b)) (which
gives her (b− Vi(b)− s)), or takeCi(s). If she is either unmatched or matched
but has to take the buyer’s oﬀer or leave it, then her payoﬀ is Ci(s). A buyer
will oﬀer s + Ci(s) (which gives him b − s − Ci(s)) and will get Vi(b) if he
makes an unacceptable oﬀer, remains unmatched or has to take or leave a
seller oﬀer.
Rearranging (4), we obtain
b− Vi(b) =
cb
πbλ
+Es[min{Ci(s) + s, b− Vi(b)}]. (5)
If the minimum operator in (5) selected the second argument for all b and
s then this would imply cbπbλ = 0 which is not true. Hence b − Vi(b) must
be constant (otherwise, the derivative with respect to b would diﬀer on the
two sides of the equation). Denoting the marginal traders by b∗ and s∗,
by definition we have that Vi(b∗) = 0, Vi(s∗) = 0. Therefore, b − Vi(b) ≡
b∗ − Vi(b∗) ≡ b∗. This implies that we can drop the expectations operator
from (3). Note that Vi(b) = b − b∗ is strictly increasing in b and so only
buyers with a valuation, b > b∗ will choose to participate.
For all participating sellers, b − Vi(b) − s = b∗ − s > Ci(s) (if for any s,
b∗−s < Ci(s) then — by (3) — either VD(s) = CD(s)−cs which implies VD(s) =
−csd or VC(s) = CC(s) − cs which implies VC(s) = −cs or VC(s) = −
cs+ds
d ).
Consequently, the first maximum operator in (3) and minimum operator in
(5) always select the first arguments. Rearranging the “operatorless” (5) and
(3), we have
Vi(b) = b−Es[Ci(s) + s]−
cb
πbλ
(6)
Vi(s) = πs(1− λ)(b∗ − s) + (1− πs(1− λ))Ci(s)− cs (7)
The following result (proved in the Appendix) establishes somemonotonic-
ity properties which will be useful in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1 i) Vi(s) is strictly decreasing in s.
ii) If d > 0, then the price oﬀered by any buyer b, Ci(s)+s, is independent
of b, non-decreasing in s and strictly increasing in s in a non-degenerate
interval, [bs, s∗]. If d = 0 then Ci(s) + s ≡ s∗.
10
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A solution to (6) and (7) with V (b∗) = V (s∗) = 0 and either πs = 1,
πb 6 1 or πb = 1, πs 6 1 is a steady state equilibrium12, (since Vi(b) is strictly
increasing in b and Vi(s) is strictly decreasing in s, buyers with b > b∗ and
sellers with s 6 s∗ will enter each period). We focus on equilibria where the
trading frictions are small:
Proposition 1 When the participation costs are suﬃciently small, there is
a unique steady-state equilibrium (with trade). In this equilibrium there is a
buyer queue and the steady-state quantity traded is z = G−1( cs
1−λ).
When frictions are larger, steady-state equilibria with seller queues can
also exist. We characterize these in the appendix.
Proof. For the marginal seller, Vi(s∗) = Ci(s∗) = 0. Plugging this back into
(7) evaluated at s = s∗ yields
b∗ − s∗ = cs
πs(1− λ)
(8)
Consider the case where there is no seller queue, πs = 1. In a steady-state
with no seller queue, the measure of entering buyers and sellers must be the
same and from (8) this measure must be z = G−1( cs
1−λ) (since b
∗ = P d(z),
s∗ = P s(z) and πs = 1). This measure of trade must be positive to avoid
a degenerate solution, hence the sellers’ participation cost must not be too
large: cs < (1− λ)G(0). Rearranging (6) we have
π∗b =
cb
(P d(z)−Es[Ci(s) + s])λ
.
Since — by Lemma 1ii — s∗ > Ci(s) + s for all participating sellers and since
b∗ ≥ s∗ it follows that b∗ > Es[Ci(s)+s]. Hence P d(z) > Es[Ci(s)+s]. From
the proof of Lemma 1 it follows that P d(z)−Es[Ci(s) + s] is independent of
cb (as long as π∗s = 1). Hence, if cb < λ(P
d(z) − Es[Ci(s) + s]) then π∗b < 1
and we have an equilibrium with a buyer queue. This is the unique solution
to the steady-state equations with πs = 1. To show that this is the unique
steady-state equilibrium (with trade) we must rule out an equilibrium with
a seller queue, πb = 1, πs < 1. Assume that for a given value of cb, such an
equilibrium existed. From (6), (with πb = 1) we have
cb = λ (b
∗ −Es[Ci(s) + s]) . (9)
12Eﬃcient matching rules out the case where πb < 1 and πs < 1.
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All we have left to do in order to complete the proof is to establish a positive
lower bound for the right-hand side of this equation. Rewrite (9) as
cb = λ (b
∗ − s∗ + s∗ −Es[Ci(s) + s]) . (10)
From (8) we know that b∗− s∗ ≥ 0, while from Lemma 1ii we have that s∗ >
Es[Ci(s)+s] for all s∗ consistent with trade. Hence, unless b∗ = s∗, the proof
is complete. Assume b∗ = s∗, which will only happen if cs = 0 (see (8)). This
implies that s∗ equals pc, which is significantly above the lowest seller type
and therefore bounded away from zero. Thus, since by Lemma 1, Ci(s) + s
is strictly increasing on a non-degenerate interval, [bs, s∗], s∗− Es[Ci(s) + s]
is bounded away from zero.
The steady-state characteristics can also be explained intuitively. In a
steady-state equilibrium the marginal traders must have participation values
of zero. Since all the buyers have the same cost cb, the same bargaining
power λ and the same probability of trading πb and they face the same dis-
tribution of sellers, it follows that the diﬀerence between a buyer’s valuation
b and steady-state participation value V (b) must be the same for all buyers.
Combining this with the fact that the marginal buyer, b∗, has a participation
value of zero we have b − V (b) = b∗. This implies that a seller will ask the
same price, b∗, from every buyer. To see that the buyer does not oﬀer the
same price to every seller, consider the extreme situation, when the good
lasts only a single day (d = 1). In this case, the buyer only has to oﬀer the
seller her cost, s. Hence a buyer will make a smaller surplus when trading
with the marginal seller than when trading with a seller with a lower value.
This continues to hold when the perishing rate is less than 1 but greater
than zero. In agreement with the literature on non-perishable goods (see,
for example, Mortensen and Wright, 2002), when d = 0, this price dispersion
disappears.13
When the marginal buyer is matched with the marginal seller, his ex-
pected surplus is λ(b∗ − s∗) − cb = λ cs1−λ − cb which will be positive when
cb is suﬃciently small. Since he makes a greater surplus from other sellers
his expected surplus will be positive when cb is suﬃciently small, even when
cs = 0. Consequently, there must be a buyer queue to ensure V (b∗) = 0.
In the d = 0 case it is well known that, whether we have a sellers’ or a
buyers’ market is determined by the Hosios condition.14 We reproduce this
13More precisely, the price will be the independent outcome of the same lottery in every
match.
14This condition was first derived in Hosios (1990).
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result here.
Corollary 1 If d = 0, in steady state the Hosios condition holds:
πb
πs
=
(1− λ)cb
λcs
.
Proof. When d = 0, Vi(.) ≡ Ci(.). Hence (6) and (7) become
Vi(b) = b−Es[Vi(s) + s]−
cb
πbλ
(11)
and
Vi(s) = b
∗ − s− cs
πs(1− λ)
. (12)
Substituting the latter into the former and evaluating it at b = b∗, we get
Vi(b
∗) =
cs
πs(1− λ)
− cb
πbλ
= 0.
In words, we have a balanced market (πb = πs = 1) if and only if the
bargaining powers are proportional to the costs of staying in the market. The
side of the market which has a higher relative bargaining power than that will
have to suﬀer queues, to keep the market in its steady state. It is important
to note the discontinuity: if d = 0, it is the Hosios condition that determines
which side of the market has a queue, if d > 0 then it is the buyers’ waiting
cost on its own. That is, if we fix cb at a suﬃciently small value then — by
Proposition 1 — independently of the value of cs we will have a buyer queue,
when d > 0, but we would get a seller queue if cs <
(1−λ)cb
λ when d = 0. The
intuition for this lack of continuity comes from the fact that the perishability
of her good and the participation costs of the seller both weaken the seller’s
bargaining power. When d > 0, and the buyers are strong (low cb), the seller
would need a subsidy to be able to compensate for this. Simply taking cs to
zero is not suﬃcient to put the sellers into the driver’s seat.
The above argument not only demonstrates that the Hosios condition
does not apply when the good is perishable but also shows that it is not
robust to the order in which we take limits.
Corollary 1 also implies that in a balanced market with d = 0, we also
have z = xe. That is, not only is there no loss due to waiting (by definition),
but given the fixed costs, there is also the eﬃcient amount of trade. To see
13
Anwar and Sákovics: A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/7/15 3:25 PM
this, note that by Proposition 1, in a balanced market it must be the case
that G(z) = cs
1−λ . Using the Hosios condition (evaluated at πs = πb = 1), we
also have G(xe) = cb + cs = λcs(1−λ) + cs =
cs
1−λ .
However, the eﬃcient outcome is not possible when d > 0.
Corollary 2 If d > 0, then it is not possible to have both a balanced market
(πs = πb = 1) and the eﬃcient measure of trade (xe).
Proof. In a balanced market the measure of trade must be z = G−1( cs
1−λ)
and eﬃciency requires that the measure of trade is xe = G−1(cs+ cb). Hence
cs
1−λ = cs + cb. Re-arranging gives
cb
λ =
cs
1−λ . Hence b
∗ − s∗ = cs
(1−λ) =
cb
λ or
s∗ = b∗− cbλ . Substituting this into (6) gives V (b∗) = s∗−Es[Ci(s)+s], which
by Lemma 1 must be greater than zero. Hence, when we have the eﬃcient
volume of trade, there must be a buyer queue in the steady-state equilibrium.
The intuition for this follows from our earlier discussion. If we have a
steady state where the volume of trade is xe and there is no seller queue,
then the marginal buyer and marginal seller generate a net surplus of zero.
We know that the marginal seller will make zero on average when matched
with the marginal (or any other) buyer, so the marginal buyer must also
make zero on average, when matched with the marginal seller. However, if
this were the case then the “marginal” buyer would make positive surpluses
when matched with sellers with lower values and we would have further
entry, leading to a buyer queue. Note that price dispersion is crucial here, as
without price dispersion the last part of the argument would not apply. In
that case, if the marginal buyer makes zero on average when matched with
the marginal seller, then he will make zero on average when matched with
any seller (as the expected price would be the same) and no queue would be
necessary.
We now look at the steady-state equilibrium in the limit as the partici-
pation costs go to zero.
Let p denote the average transaction price in the market and let p∗ denote
its limit as the participation costs tend to zero (along any path).
Proposition 2 In the limiting equilibrium as the costs of participation tend
to zero (along any path), the amount of trade taking place coincides with the
competitive one (xc). Unless d = 0, the limiting queue of the buyers is infinite
and the aggregate waiting cost (per period) is given by W = (pc − p∗)xc > 0.
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Proof. When d > 0, from Proposition 1 we must have a buyer queue in
the limit equilibrium. It is straightforward from the definition of z that in
a sellers’ market the limiting amount of trade is G−1(0) = xc, b∗ → pc and
s∗ → pc. The welfare loss caused by the permanent excess demand is the
aggregate participation cost of all buyers in each period.15 Let B = z/πb be
the measure of buyers in the steady state equilibrium. Substituting this into
(6) and rearranging gives
Bcb = (b
∗ −Es[Ci(s) + s])λz. (13)
We also have
(pc − p∗)xc = (pc − λEs[Ci(s) + s]− (1− λ)pc)xc
= (pc −Es[Ci(s) + s])λxc
= lim
(cb,cs)→(0,0)
Bcb.
By Lemma 1 pc > Es[Ci(s) + s]. Hence, (pc − p∗)xc > 0.
In Figure 2 one can visualize the functioning of the limit equilibrium.
Note that the per period loss, W , is the (shaded) area between the expected
price curve, lim(cb,cs)→(0,0) p(s(x)), and the competitive price.
p 
x
pc 
xc
p*(s(x)) 
Pd(x) 
Ps(x) 
The dead-weight loss in the limit as the costs disappear
15Alternatively, we could define the welfare loss as the participation cost of traders who
do not actually trade in that period. As the limiting amount of trade is finite, the limiting
value of the aggregate cost would be unaltered.
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The intuition for this is simple. The marginal buyer makes an expected
surplus of b∗− p. This must be balanced with an expected loss (which is the
same for all buyers) of cb +
P∞
n=1(1− πb)ncb =
cb
πb . In the limit, we have
pc − p∗ = lim
(cs,cb)→(0,0)
cb
πb
.
Now, note that the aggregate loss “newly generated” in every period is
xc lim(cs,cb)→(0,0)
cb
πb . Since we are in steady state, this aggregate loss must
equal the aggregate delay cost suﬀered in every period, W. Putting these
together, we have that
W = (pc − p∗)xc,
which corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2.16 This reinforces the point
(made after Corollary 2) that price dispersion is crucial to the ineﬃciency of
the market. The figure illustrates that any measures that reduce the price
dispersion (reducing λ or d) will also reduce the loss.
6 Implications for the strategic foundations
of competitive equilibrium
The above result may sound like a serious blow to the non-cooperative foun-
dations of competitive equilibrium. After all, why should perishability pre-
vent the market from reaching eﬃciency as per period frictions disappear?
In this section, we examine both the intuition for and the robustness of our
ineﬃciency result, further clarifying our understanding of competitive equi-
librium.
One way to understand the ineﬃciency caused by perishability is to realize
that technically, perishability is equivalent to the discounting of the sellers’
future utility. In other words, our results would not change if we reinterpreted
1 − d as the sellers’ discount factor (holding the buyers’ discount factor at
one) and assumed that the good was non-perishable. Since discounting is a
friction, it is not surprising that it should lead to ineﬃciency.17
16An alternative way of thinking of the marginal buyer’s problem at the limiting equi-
librium is that she is given a lottery ticket at cost cb and with probability πb she earns a
prize of pc − p∗.
17Note that our model — even with the asymmetric discounting interpretation — is distinct
from Bose (1996), whose analysis is centered on heterogeneous time preferences on the same
side of the market.
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One has to be careful with how far to take this argument though. For
example, we should not say that in light of the above we should only be
interested in the limit as the period length — and therefore both discounting
and additive costs of delay — tends to zero. The reasons for this are twofold.
First, there are markets where looking at the limit as perishability disap-
pears would make no sense. Think of markets for (individualized) services.18
These neatly fit our model, if we allow the sellers to return to the market
after having served a customer. Note that the assumption of repeating sell-
ers makes no diﬀerence to the analysis as long as the market interaction is
anonymous. Now, if a dentist, say, cannot treat a patient between 9:30 and
10:00, she cannot postpone delivery of the treatment to 10:00-10:30, since in
equilibrium she expects to treat another patient by then. Hence the oppor-
tunity to provide the 9:30-10:00 service only exists between 9:30 and 10:00.
In our model this is the case where the good perishes with probability 1.
Setting d = 1, the aggregate loss in the limit is (pc −Es[s |s∗ = P s(xc) ])λxc.
The bottom line is that in a decentralized model of services, there will be
an important dead-weight loss even in the limit as the waiting costs tend to
zero. Consequently, it should not be thought of — even approximately — as a
competitive market.
The second reason against hastily taking limits is that it is not necessary.
Consider a model where the death rate is changing over time — but the buyers
cannot tell the age of the good.19 Although such a process is not stationary,
we now show that the steady-state equilibrium of the stationary model where
the death rate is constant is also an equilibrium of this model, whenever the
market has the buyers queueing.
Proposition 3 For waiting costs close enough to zero, the model where the
perishing rate is variable but non-decreasing over time — and the buyers can-
not tell the age of the good — has a steady-state (Perfect Bayesian) equilib-
rium, which leads to the same outcome as the unique steady-state (subgame-
perfect) equilibrium (with trade) in the model where the death rate is constant
at d1 > 0.
Proof. Let Vi(.) be the steady-state equilibrium value function of a trader
in the case where the death rate is always d1. From Proposition 1 we have
18See Ponsatí and Sákovics (2005) for a related model with vertically diﬀerentiated
service providers.
19Note that in our main model knowing the age of the good provides no additional
information (by the stationarity of the perishing process).
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a buyer queue for low enough costs of waiting. Hence, in the steady-state
equilibrium the sellers always trade in period one and thus the buyers are
always matched with a new entrant:
Vi(s) = (1− λ)Eb[b− s− Vi(b)] + λCi(s)− cs
Vi(b) = πbλEs[b− s− Ci(s)] + (1− πbλ)Vi(b)− cb.
Now, consider whether the same outcome is supported by an equilibrium
of the non-stationary model. Let V ni (s) be the value function for the owner
of a good in the nth period of its life and Cni (s) the value at the point where
they have failed to trade in period n. By hypothesis, the sellers are always
matched in the first period. Consider the value functions when the buyers
always oﬀer the sellers C1i (s):
V 1i (s) = (1− λ)Eb[max{b− s− Vi(b), C1i (s)}] + λC1i (s)− cs
V 2i (s) = (1− λ)Eb[max{b− s− Vi(b), C2i (s)}] + λmax{C1i (s), C2i (s)}− cs
...
V ni (s) = (1− λ)Eb[max{b− s− Vi(b), Cni (s)}] + λmax{C1i (s), Cni (s)}− cs
...
V (b) = πbλEs[max{b− s− C1i (s), Vi(b)}] + (1− πbλ)Vi(b)− cb.
Now, since 1 − dn ≥ 1 − dn+1, we have that C1i (s) ≥ Cni (s), for all n. As a
result, all the max operations are resolved in favor of the (stationary) left-
hand argument — corresponding to trade occurring in every match, thereby
validating the hypothesis that all the sellers trade in their first period in the
market, implying that V 1i (s) ≡ V ni (s) ≡ Vi(s) for all n.
Intuitively, since in the hypothetical equilibrium the buyers are queuing,
all the sellers are matched and thus, as long as they always trade, the buyers
are always faced with sellers of “new” goods, and thus have no new incentive
to deviate. The only thing that can go wrong is that a seller who in period
one prefers to trade rather than to wait, in a later period prefers to wait
(because the death rate has dropped), but this is ruled out by the realistic
assumption of a non-decreasing death rate. As a result, a seller indeed never
18
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stays in the market for more than one period, and thus her entry decision
will also only depend on her first-period perishing rate.
By Proposition 3, if we take the limit as d1 → 0 in the non-stationary
model, then the welfare loss converges to zero even though dn > 0, n =
2, 3, . . . . That is, we do not need all the perishability to disappear in order to
regain eﬃciency. The (almost) certain option to costlessly switch bargaining
partners at least once is necessary and suﬃcient to obtain the competitive
outcome.
One way to think of this in terms of our dentist example, is that each
dentist needs to take a break once in every two periods, but she is indiﬀerent
between taking this break now or in the next period. If she fails to sell in the
first period, she uses this as her break but then definitely wants to provide
the service in the next period. This market is equivalent to dn = 0 and dn+1
= 1, for n odd. In the eﬃcient equilibrium half the dentists would work in
odd periods and half in even periods.
It is eye-opening to note that Proposition 3 does not hold with d1 = 0.
That is, the equilibrium of the standard non-perishable good model is in
general not an equilibrium of the non-stationary model. To see this, note
that if the good is not perishable the long side of the market is decided by
the Hosios condition. Consequently, no matter how low the costs are, we may
have the sellers queuing. In that case, in the non-stationary model there is a
new incentive to deviate in period 2, as it is no longer a credible belief that
all the sellers are “new”.
7 Conclusion
We have made a number of achievements in this paper. First, we have pro-
vided the analysis of the steady state of a decentralized market for perish-
able goods (including services). Second, we have shown that such a market
is inherently ineﬃcient. Third, we have shown that even if — using the dis-
counting interpretation — the existence of ineﬃciency is not too surprising,
the manifestation of it is. Rather than an ineﬃcient quantity being traded,
the welfare loss appears in the form of queueing. We have also shown that
the standard model’s prediction about which side of the market is the short
side (c.f. Hosios condition) is not robust to perturbations in the perishability
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dimension.20 Finally, we have also provided a tight result on what exactly
is necessary for the decentralized market to provide a non-cooperative foun-
dation of competitive equilibrium: that each agent should be guaranteed a
second opportunity to trade.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First consider the durable good case. Solving for VD(s) using (7) we have
VD(s) =
πs(1− λ)(b∗ − s)− cs
d+ πs(1− λ)(1− d)
which is strictly decreasing in s. Now consider CD(s) + s
CD(s) + s = (1− d)VD(s) + s =
(1− d)(πs(1− λ)b∗ − cs)
d+ πs(1− λ)(1− d)
+ ds
which is strictly increasing in s if d > 0. In this case, bs = P S(0).When d = 0,
CD(s) + s ≡ b∗ − cs/ πs(1− λ) = s∗.
Now consider the consumption good case. If (1− d)VC(s)− ds > 0 then
solving for VC(s) using (7) we have
VC(s) =
πs(1− λ)b∗ − cs
d+ πs(1− λ)(1− d)
− s (14)
If (1− d)VC(s)− ds < 0 then solving for VC(s) using (7) we have
VC(s) = πs(1− λ)(b∗ − s)− cs
In both scenarios VC(s) is strictly decreasing in s.
Now consider CC(s)+s in the two scenarios when d > 0: if (1−d)VC(s)−
ds > 0
CC(s) + s = (1− d)VC(s)− ds+ s =
(1− d)(πs(1− λ)b∗ − cs)
d+ πs(1− λ)(1− d)
20This non-robustness carries over to the discounting interpretation. Hence, when buyers
and sellers discount at diﬀerent rates, Gale’s (1987) arguments in favor of looking at the
market equilibrium at the limit of no discounting do not fully apply.
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and if (1− d)VC(s)− ds < 0
CC(s) + s = s.
Finally consider the pivotal seller, bs for whom (1−d)VC(bs)−dbs = 0. Plugging
this into (14) and solving for bs gives
bs = (1− d)(πs(1− λ)b∗ − cs)
d+ πs(1− λ)(1− d)
=
(1− d)πs(1− λ)s∗
d+ πs(1− λ)(1− d)
< s∗. (15)
Hence for s > bs, (1− d)VC(s) − ds < 0 and CC(s) + s = s which is strictly
increasing in s. For s < bs, CC(s) + s = bs is constant in s. When d = 0, we
are always in the latter case and CC(s) + s ≡ s∗.
8.2 Steady-states with seller queues
Here we look at what happens when cb is not suﬃciently small to ensure a
buyer queue. Let xs and xb be the steady-state measure of entering buyers
and sellers. Then b∗ = P d(xb) and s∗ = P s(xs). Substituting this into (6),
the condition for Vi(b∗) = 0 is
P d(xb) = Es[Ci(s) + s]−
cb
πbλ
(16)
and using (8) the condition for V (s∗) = 0 is
P d(xb)− P s(xs) =
cs
πs(1− λ)
(17)
In the balanced case where there is no buyer or seller queue, πb = πs = 1
and xs = xb = z. If
cb > λ(P
d(z)−Es[Ci(s) + s])
then P d(z) < 0 and a buyer with value P d(z) will not enter. From this
point, it is not possible to get a steady state with a buyer queue as this will
only decrease P d(z). Hence in any steady-state equilibrium xb < z. This also
implies that P d(xb) − P s(xs) will have to rise and to ensure the condition
Vi(s
∗) = 0 there will be a seller queue, πs < 1. However, there is an additional
complication with a seller queue that arises from the fact that some sellers
who fail to trade leave the market and so the stock of sellers decreases. In
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the durable good case the number leaving is simply LD = (S − xb)d. In the
consumption good case we will also lose the sellers who decide to leave the
market and consume the good. From (15) the measure of sellers we lose is
xL = xs − (P s)−1(bs) and LC = xL + (S − xb − xL)d. Hence we have an
additional condition for a steady-state equilibrium,
xs − xb = Li (18)
A steady-state equilibrium, (xs, xb, S) is a solution to (16), (17) and (18)
with πb = 1 and πs = xs/S.
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